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Abstract

This research project explores factors affected levels of ethnic violence in the Western
Balkans in the 1990’s. What caused the violent outbreak and further spread of civil unrest
of the different ethnic groups, culminating in the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s?
Following a comparative analysis format, this project analyzes secondary sources such as
government documents, reports by international human rights organizations and
theoretical work from the field of international relations to help answer this question.
While there are many factors that influence ethnic conflict and minority violence, NATO
influence seemed to have the most impact in this area. The main factors studied are the
lack of cultural knowledge and strategic militarist interventions by NATO are analyzed.
These results show that ethnic violence has certain emotional triggers that can be avoided
by appropriate government policies and actions.
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iv

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Joseph Weinberg for taking the time to advise and help with this
honors thesis. His advice, research skills, and encouragement have helped me not only to
complete this project, but also through a difficult semester in my life. When I thought I
would be unable to finish my thesis, his dedication and encouragement allowed me to
create a project of which I am proud. I am thankful to be able to call Dr. Weinberg my
advisor, professor, and friend.

v

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature ................................................................................6
Chapter 3: Methodology..................................................................................................16
Chapter 4: Factors of Ethnic Violence: NATO Intervention.......................................19
Chapter 5: Implications ...................................................................................................33
References .........................................................................................................................35

vi

Chapter I: Problem Statement
South Eastern Europe has experienced a tumultuous recent history. Unstable institutions,
ethnic tensions, war, and territorial disputes plaque the relatively new countries. While
the rest of the world focuses their attention on other regions, governments of Balkan
states struggle to maintain peace and order. The Balkan countries, all with new and
unstable government bodies, have managed to make an impressive impact on the world’s
stage. However, all of the countries face ethnic conflicts with the minority populations,
and the governments seem to struggle with the issue of regulating and resolving the
conflicts. This study hopes to compare how different state approaches to the treatment of
minorities affect levels of ethnic conflict the Western Balkans in a comparative analysis
format.
The Creation and Fall of Yugoslavia (1918-1990)
To understand how the treatment of minority populations compares between the
two cases, one must first understand the history of ethnic tension in the region. Although
Yugoslavia officially became a fully, recognized state in 1918, the idea of a single state
for Slavic people emerged around the 17th century. When formed, the largest region with
the most people, the Kingdom of Serbia, gained power and influence over the region.
Only 10 years into the formation of the Yugoslavia state, King Alexander I decided to
abolish all historic, and ethnic areas to create five new, albeit arbitrarily drawn, borders.
The subsequent years marked by World War II brought fascism and communism to the
Balkan region, further causing strain among different groups. This begun an age of ethnic
tensions resulting in the oppression of minority populations.
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In 1945, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed, establishing
six republics, an autonomous province, and an autonomous district in the constitution.
The Socialist Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,
Kosovo, and Macedonia were created largely by trying to include whatever majority
ethnic population was located in the area. The six republics continued to evolve
throughout the Cold War. Even though the Republics were formed with some ethnic
considerations in mind, the six were doomed to fail. One of the biggest factors that led to
the break-up of Yugoslavia was the creation of autonomous provinces in ethnic Albanianmajority populated Kosovo and the mixed-populated Vojvodina, which significantly
reduced Serbia's influence in the country. By 1981, protests in Kosovo calling for more
autonomy from the Serbian region shook the unstable region to the breaking point. The
Kosovo-Serbia conflict intensified when Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević
sought to restore pre-1974 Serbian sovereignty, voting to reduce autonomy of Kosovo
and Vojvodina. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe coupled with ethnic conflict,
countrywide rioting, and minority based violence caused the fall of Yugoslavia. While all
six republics held multi-party elections in 1990, some republics embraced
democratization more quickly than others.
Kosovo-Serbia Relations after Yugoslavia
After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia all declared independence, while Serbia and Montenegro remained united to
form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Shortly into 1990, the Yugoslav Wars
erupted with massive engagements in Croatia and Bosnia. Serbian nationalists opposed
independence from Yugoslavia, and received logistical and financial support from the
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FRY. The ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo rejected Serbian engagements in Croatia
and Bosnia, causing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to be formed. From 1995-1996,
the KLA started its campaign to sabotage Serbian-run police stations in Kosovo, and
started to receive smuggled weapons from Albania. With ethnic tensions between the
Serbs and ethnic-Albanians at an all-time high, the Kosovo War broke out in 1998. Over
the course of a year, multiple diplomatic solutions failed, NATO intervened on behalf of
a “humanitarian war”, and over 3,000 victims died as casualties of war. The conflict was
marked by swift action, and horrific results. The conflict finally ended with the signing of
the Kumanovo Treaty that called for the removal of FRY troops from Kosovo and
establishing a ground and air safe zone between each country.
From 2000 to 2008, the status of Kosovo was disputed, with ethnic tensions at an
all-time high and treatment of minorities at an all-time low. After 8 years of civil unrest,
Kosovo called for its independence from Serbia. Kosovo’s independence was
immediately rejected by Serbia whose government imposed an Action Plan to combat the
decision from Kosovo. Serbia still does not officially recognize Kosovo as a sovereign
nation. While diplomatic relations have been reinstated slightly, the two countries still
remain in conflict. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs not only remember the horrors of past
ethnic tensions, but also remain stuck in the old ways of nationalism and ethnic
discrimination.
The Greece-Macedonia Name Dispute
With many countries declaring independence after the fall of Yugoslavia, The
Republic of Macedonia or Macedonia was one of the first countries to secede in 1991
through a referendum supporting independence from Yugoslavia. Macedonia’s break
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from Yugoslavia was characterized with peaceful democratic transition, unlike the
majority of Balkan states. The country also managed to maintain its borders only
undergoing small changes throughout the 1990’s. While Macedonia was peaceful within
the country, their independence started a conflict that is still affecting the country today.
The Greece-Macedonia name dispute started when Greece began to openly object
to the usage of the term “Macedonia” by the country of Macedonia. The term
“Macedonia” came from the ancient tribe of Macedon whose ancestors inhabited what is
now the northern region of Greece and parts of Macedonia. The history of the term
“Macedonia” and area inhabited by the Macedon tribe are sacred to many people who
believe that ancient Macedonia was the cradle of modern life. Because of the crosscultural ties to both Greeks and Macedonians, the use of the term and culture is highly
debated. Greece’s official stance is that the dispute could be solved if Macedonia used a
geographical qualifier, like “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Macedonians reject the notion believing that they have a right to the culture just like the
Greeks do. Since the northern portion of Greece is called Macedonia, which borders the
country of Macedonia, the debate has pitted both countries against one another. Greece
cites the possibility of Macedonia wanting a “United Macedonia”, which would take the
Macedonia region from Greece to form a united territory. Although most Macedonians
completely reject this idea of territorial gain from Greece, Greece and Macedonia are still
at odds over the name. The millions of ethnic Greeks who consider themselves
Macedonian do not believe that the Macedonians from the country of Macedonia should
have claim of the culture. This dispute, while seemingly unimportant, has completely
changed the course of both nations both domestically and internationally.
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Because of this name dispute, Greece has continually blocked Macedonia from all
forms of international organizations. Macedonia was only allowed into the United
Nations under the “temporary name”, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYRM). This name that Greece picked for Macedonia is still seen on some official
documents, making the name official. While over 130 countries officially recognize
Macedonia’s constitutional name, Greece has made few efforts to solve the issue. In
1995, Macedonia signed a UN Interim Accord with Greece making significant changes to
the country’s flag in order to remove disputed cultural symbols like the Vergina Sun.
While Macedonia made changes to the flag and constitution, Greece promised to not
block Macedonia from organization if name the FYRM was used. In 2008, however,
Greece blocked Macedonia’s accession into NATO because of the name dispute.
Although the International Court of Justice ruled that Greece illegally blocked Macedonia
from NATO, violating the Interim Accord, weak support from the international
community has allowed the Greece-Macedonia name dispute continue.
This dispute has had a horrible effect on the citizens of both countries, particularly
the minorities in Macedonia and Greece. As quoted from the Human Rights Report about
Macedonian minorities in Greece, their “internationally recognized human rights and
even their existence are vigorously denied by the Greek government.” Thousands of
reports of discrimination and abuse of minorities both Macedonian and non-Macedonian
abound in Greece. The basic right of self-determination is questioned every day by
minorities in Greece.
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Chapter II. Literature Review
Ethnic conflict has always been a large problem in Southeastern European countries. The
Balkans, in particular, have been largely susceptible to ethnic conflict due to the peculiar
mixture of age-old ethnic rivalries and newly formed governments. In these cases, there
are certain factors that seem to contribute to the growing tension between minorities and
governments in these countries. Although the literature covers a wide variety of subjects,
this review will cover three specific subjects that illustrate the problems and possible
solutions of ethnic tension in the western Balkans: issues of identity/self-determination,
conflict regulation, and territorial autonomy. The material present in this review will help
enlighten the connections between the governments of these countries and how their
regulation of minority violence affects ethnic conflict in the two countries.
Issues of Identity and Self-Determination
Issues with identity and self-determination are a century’s old problem. Even with
the earliest civilizations, minority or indigenous peoples found themselves fighting to
hold on to their culture and history. While there are multiple definitions of the term
“identity”, James D. Fearon’s study of identity reveals the word and its meaning have
changed over time. Fearon’s study shows that our present meaning of the word “identity”
has just recently come to include factors like culture, language, race, and ethnicity
(Fearon 38). Fearon continues to explain that the term “identity” is at the heart of
comparative and international politics, and has two different meanings depending on the
person. The first part is described as a “social identity.” This category is most often the
standard description of a person, encompassing terms like “American”, “French”,
“mother”, and “teacher”. This identity is often based on a nationality, or occupation, and
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is mostly dependent on the status of the person, rather than the feelings of that person.
The second part of identity is a “personal identity”. This category features the set factors
that the person deems socially relevant, such as culture, history, beliefs, and attitudes
(Fearon 13). This part of identity can sometimes contradict one’s social identity. For
example, while the Albanians in Serbia held “citizens of Serbia” as their national identity,
the group more closely aligned with their personal identity that represented their shared
ethnicity and culture. This study is extremely relevant to this paper because the issues and
complexities of identity are some of the main factors of ethnic conflict in the Balkan
region.
Issues with identity continue far past their social and personal contexts; some
problems of identity have led to problems of self-determination. Self-determination
officially became an international right in 1949 with the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights. While the right was given to the entire international community, many
have debated the exact meaning of self-determination. Authors Aleksandar Pavkovic and
Peter Rada debated some of the implications of self-determination in their study. The
authors believed that there are two problems with the theory of self-determination: the
ongoing struggle between self-determination and territorial integrity and the implications
of state that use self-determination for secession (Pavkovic and Rada 1). Selfdetermination is the right of nation or people to freely choose its international political
status, while territorial integrity maintains the current borders and boundaries already
established. The authors outline different schools of political science that focus on
nationhood. Realist political theory values territorial integrity over self-determination,
while liberal internationalism explains that because of greater individual liberties and
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expanding international cooperation throughout the world, people have a greater sense of
self-determination and identity (Pavkovic and Rada 7). The issue of territorial integrity
and self-determination is not only debated in international relations theory, but also
present in countries around the world. This study of self-determination is relevant to my
paper because of both Greece and Macedonia, and Serbia and Kosovo’s issues with selfdetermination and border disputes.
While there are many nations facing issues with territory, the international
community has yet to establish criteria for succession that is justified and should then
officially recognized. In Aleksandar Pavkovic’s article, “Secession, Majority Rule and
Equal Rights: A Few Questions”, the issues of international justification for secession are
discussed. While Pavkovic covers theories such as Anarcho-Capitalism or Democratic
Secessionism, the most prevalent theory seen in the Balkans is that of Cultural
Secessionism (Pavkovic 5). This theory explains that a minority has a right to secession if
the parent country has disallowed the development of the minority culture. The author
explains that the institutions of the majority are created in a way that automatically
“excludes any minority culture and those who share it” (Pavkovic 6). This theory of
cultural secessionism is seen in many parts of the world, but is especially prevalent in
Southeastern Europe. While the newly formed governments of the Balkan region have
tried to establish democratic institutions, the discrimination seen in the Cold War era is
still present in those countries. These theories of secession will help explain why some
countries choose to recognize some counties, but not others.
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Conflict Regulation
With so many conflicts ending in violent conformations and war, governments are
now looking at ways in which to solve ethnic conflicts peacefully and efficiently. Within
the last decade a new field of political science, “Peace and Conflict Studies”, has become
one of the most widely applicable areas in the study. In Mary Frances Lebamoff and
Zoran Ilievski’s article about the regulation of conflict in Macedonia, the authors delve
into the types and the regulations of ethnic conflict. The authors use the common
definition of conflict regulation that covers any practices or methods that help facilitate
the peaceful ending of conflict. The authors even describe three different types of ethnic
conflict that conflict regulation can help manage. The first type of ethnic conflict is
“group-state conflict”, which is tension between a minority and state institutions
(Lebamoff and Ilievski 1). The other types of conflict are “inter-group conflict”, which is
conflict between the host nation and a minority, and conflict between two or more
minorities. While these conflicts share some of the same aspects, the conflicts should all
be dealt with separately. Both authors believe that every ethnic conflict is waged because
of the clash of values or culture or the struggle for resources and power (Lebamoff and
Ilievski 3). The different factors that cause ethnic conflict, like the situation in
Macedonia, create a condition that leaves the government with little to influence the
conflict.
Another key portion of this article is the explanation of three different types of
conflict regulation. Since the authors believe that different ethnic conflicts should be
dealt with in different ways, they describe ways to help reduce tensions in a situation like
in Macedonia. The theory of “consociational” calls for elite power sharing within the

9

society. The main argument for “consociational” is that with power being shared among
all groups, not just majority in power, the policies and laws will be less restrictive and
more accessible to all ethnic groups in the state (Lebamoff and Ilievski 4). While many
believe that the redistribution of power will grant all ethnic groups a “fair chance” in
government, there are many who doubt the theory’s effectiveness. Some political
scientists believe that sharing the power will allow for an excess of autonomy, which will
in turn great a strong incentive for secession. The second type of conflict featured in this
article is the “Integrative Approach”. This approach calls for more participation, mainly
through initiatives and policies from the State, that extends across ethnic and cultural
lines (Lebamoff and Ilievski 4). The main policy of this theory is to include more of
multi-ethnic parties in policies and local elections. By creating more self-actualization for
these groups, a stable, multi-ethnic democratic society would be possible. While both are
very popular theories of conflict regulation, these authors have created a new possibility
for governments called “Complex Power-Sharing”. This approach would call for aspects
of both the Consociational and Integrative theory, but would call for more participation
by international actors and institutions, and would also focus on “structural issues [such]
as economic management, civil-military relations, and human and minority rights”
(Lebamoff and Ilievski 5). All of these theories of conflict regulation are distinctive and
effective in their own ways showing that every ethnic conflict must be treated in a unique
way.
While there are many ways to solve ethnic conflict, why do some governments
choose to implement a plan to peacefully resolve conflict while others result in violence?
In Irina Khmelko and Krista E. Wiegand’s article, the authors try to answer that question
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using a theory that incorporates factors like institutional mechanisms and cultural
legacies. The authors used models from different countries around the world to find
factors that would increase the country’s chances of resorting to violence against ethnic
groups within the countries. After running the data, the authors found that in all ethnic
conflicts in all cases, there was one factor that appeared in every case: more than one
group was living within boundaries of the state and one or more groups felt excluded
from the political system and wanted changes in state policies (Khmelko and Wiegand 9).
While that factor is present in every case, each case of ethnic conflict and government
action is different. The authors explain that when governments use “repression”
techniques against a minority, the State is often acting defensively, fearing retaliation or
the use of force from the minority group in order to gain power or make substantial
changes to the system. The authors then argue that ethnic conflict is sometimes
guaranteed because of the nature of bonding with other of same culture, and in turn,
leaving those of unlike culture out. While both are reasons why governments choose to
oppress a minority, the authors give specific data explaining which situations are more
likely to end in violence. Violent repression of minority groups, ending in death, is 2.4
times more likely in countries with political parties that are coerced and excluded from
the political competition (Khmelko and Wiegand 24). The authors also explain that
violent repression causing death is 76 times more likely when the targets are tagged as
militant instead of civilian (Khmelko and Wiegand 25). The results of this study are
extremely helpful in this paper because the data can help explain what factors led to
violence in Serbia and relative peace in Greece.
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Territorial Autonomy
In dealing with ethnic conflict, especially in Europe, there are many different
ways for states to take action against the tension. While there are many responses to
ethnic conflict and violence, territorial autonomy is often the most sought after and
disputed option-- both for minorities and their governments. In Yash Ghai’s book called,
Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, Ghai
seeks to study the meaning of autonomy and use case study analysis of countries that
have invoked autonomy in some form. Ghai begins his article stating that the idea of
autonomy changes within the different cultures and states, resulting in major gains and
losses for the cultures involved. Some states like Canada or India enjoy relative stability
through autonomy, while other states like the former Yugo-Slav states strive for
autonomy in order to express a cultural diversity (Ghai 2). These differences in the
stability and functionality of autonomous regions seem to be directly related to the type
of autonomy involved. Ghai points out two major forms of autonomy: federal and
regional autonomous regions. Federal autonomy is used when all regions have identical
powers and share the same relationship to the central government (Ghai 8). The author
notes that while a federal autonomy allows for the sharing of powers and responsibilities,
this form does little to stem ethnic and minority tension. Federal autonomy is based
solely on fixed borders, not taking consideration for the population make-up. While this
is the most common type of autonomy, it serves little purpose in ethnically diverse
regions of the world like South Eastern Europe. The other type of autonomy, regional
autonomy, is a better answer to ethnic conflict. Regional autonomy is when a government
gives specific powers to a region where the minority makes up the majority (Ghai 8).
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This type, unlike federal autonomy, helps minorities create institutions in line with their
own cultural diversity. The major difference between the two types is that, while regional
autonomy does account for the minority population within a county, the regional type
decreases the role of the region in national government. Ghai soon points out that
studying regional autonomous territories through the lens of liberal democracy will not
properly explain the phenomenon. Regional autonomy is in itself asymmetrical because it
allows the central government to distribute powers, laws, and policies different across the
territorials, directly violating the liberal democracy tenant of similar treatment for all
(Ghai 12). Examples of both of these types of autonomy are seen throughout the world,
but with the widespread ethnic conflict, the Balkan region seems to be a testing ground
for autonomous regions and their central states.
In Stefan Wolff’s article, “Conflict Management in Divided Societies: The Many
Uses of Territorial Self-governance”, Wolf discusses the Balkan region and its
autonomous regions. Wolff cites autonomy or territorial self-governance as one of the
main answers to ethnic conflict in the Balkan region. Self-governance or TSG
arrangements help to provide utilitarian solutions that allow the different ethnic groups
and minorities to fill their need for self-determination while simultaneously conserving
the overall social and territorial stability of the existing state (Wolff 7). This cohabitation
of ethnic minorities and majority governments allows for the peaceful resolution of most
conflict, based on the premise that neither party’s identity is in jeopardy of realization.
Based on the theory of territorial autonomy, the usage of autonomy as a tactic of conflict
resolution seems to serve as the panacea for all ethnic conflict. Wolff, however, finds that
the theory and actualization of territorial autonomy differs in practice. Wolff cites that the
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focus on just the territorial dimension of autonomy only further allow for the majority
elites to gain more power over the minority (Wolff 8). To counteract that problem, Wolff
suggests that territorial self-governance should be paired with other conflict management
mechanisms in order to create a sustainable solution to ethnic conflict. A conflict
regulation mechanism like “complex power sharing” or CPS is a crucial addition to
autonomy. By devolving the central powers of the government in order to share with the
autonomous region, which can then assign powers to local institutions.
In using CPS, both the state and the territories feel a certain competency and
participation in national legislation making without infringing upon cultural diversity
(Wolff 10). Wolff explains that the success of these two conflict management techniques
relies on two factors: the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the territorial entities and the
size of the area compared to the state. When there are many different ethnic groups in an
autonomous region, CPS institutions will be more likely in order to allow all groups to
shape policy. The size of the territorial will determine how much land is valued for
resources, cultural heritage sites, and military advantages (Wolff 9). The combination of
these seems to answer the major critique of territorial self-governance. Some critics of
CPS and TSG fear that after a region has gained autonomy, the majority ethnic group in
charge will then begin to subjugate the new minority, causing more ethnic tension. While
many critique the institution of territorial self-governance, Wolff ends his article citing
the reasons explaining why autonomy is a good answer to ethnic conflict. Autonomy
offers viable alternatives that satisfy self-determination demands without decreasing the
effectiveness and stability of the state. This method allows for the peaceful negotiation of
conflict without diminishing ethnic or minority rights (Wolff 14).
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While autonomy and TSG is a popular choice for conflict regulation, the global
community still debates the legality of the issue. When Kosovo declared its independence
from Serbia in 2008, Serbia looked towards international law for legal precedent on the
matter. However, little about the issue of autonomy has been justified or declared illegal
in the realm of international law. In Alexander Osipov’s article, “Non-territorial
Autonomy and International Law”, Osipov seeks to see how international law plays into
the ideas of autonomy and TSG. Before 2007, there was no case law on the matter of
autonomy and international law had never officially recognized the term “autonomy”.
After the creation of the “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, the
international community finally saw the “right to autonomy”, but it did little to help stem
ethnic conflict (Osipov 398). In his article, Osipov studies previous case law and
international norms to understand how the international community views autonomy as a
viable solution to conflict regulation. While Osipov found that there were several
examples of hard and soft law policies that contained the rhetoric of rights and autonomy
for minorities, he discovered that most rights were granted on a ‘per se’ basis (Osipov
408). In conclusion, Osipov notes a specific and wide gap between the theory of
autonomy and TSG in international law, and the realities and functionality of determining
its legality on an international basis (Osipov 409). Questions of international law and
autonomy are important to understanding the likeness of a minority group to resort to
violence in order to gain its independence from its state. As in the case of NATO’s
involvement with Kosovo’s autonomy and then subsequent independence from Serbia,
the international community is willing to involve itself in some cases of minority conflict,
but unwilling to help in maintaining the newly formed state’s prosperity in the future.
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Chapter III. Methodology
The research design of this thesis takes the form of a comparative analysis study. Before
outlining the comparative method, a brief description of key terms is necessary. The term
“policy” or “policies” is defined in this methodology and further analysis as any specific
action or non-action by a government agency, body, or presidential mandate in regards to
a specific event. The term “ethnic violence” is defined by any measure of mistreatment of
a minority, whether emotional, physical or damage to property. “Ethnic violence” can
also be associated with majority/minority issues or minority/minority conflict.
The design will be based on the structure set by Arend Lijphart in his 1971 article,
“Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”. Lijphart defines the comparative
method as the systematic analysis of a small number of cases, or “small-N analysis”.
Lijphart’s comparative method is one scientific method that works to discover empirical
relationships among variables, correlating information in order to make generalizations
about the “small-N analysis”. For Lijphart’s comparative method, two factors must be
present within the data: the establishment of general empirical relationships among two
or more variables, and that all other variables are controlled. While Lijphart outlines the
experimental, statistical, and comparative methods in his work, this study will comprise
of a comparative analysis.
The only difference between the statistical and comparative methods is the
numbers of cases, in that the number of cases used in the comparative method is too
small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations. The weakness of
using the comparative method is that one often has two few cases to study, and many
variables to apply and correlate. In order to combat the imperfect structure of analysis,
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one must increase the number of cases when possible, reduce “property-space” analysis,
and focus the research on specific variables. After choosing the method structure of
analysis and understanding the weaknesses of said method, the researcher must then
choose her cases and variables for analysis. The “small-N” variable or cases needed to
form a comparative analysis will comprise of a study of the Western Balkans: Bosnia,
Croatia, Slovenia, Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. In this study, the independent
variable will be government policies affecting social, economic, and political conditions,
while the dependent variable will be defined as the levels of ethnic violence recorded.
After choosing method, cases, and variables, Lijphart’s method instructs the researcher to
analyze and compare explicit events, any case-specific data previously recorded, policies
or actions enacted by the “small-N” cases, or any other source related to the cases
analyzed.
In order to properly answer the research question, an analysis of secondary
sources is necessary. The literature reviewed will consist of historical reports,
government documents, first-hand accounts of the ethnic violence experienced, and
official reports recorded from organizations like human rights groups, non-profit research
institutions, and academics in the field. Evidence and literature from the late 1980-current
will be analyzed. This set of sources was produced based on the timeline of events
starting from the fall of Yugoslavia to the formation of the new nation states, both of
which are crucial to this study. These sources will be used to answer the research
questions presented in this thesis in hopes to find certain factors that cause ethnic
violence.
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Case studies of each country will also be analyzed in order to better expose the
official practices and policies of governments in times of war and ethnic conflict. While
this study will primarily consist of the qualitative analysis of secondary material,
economic data, like the “Index of Economic Freedom Report”, will also be used to show
the economic status of countries before, during, and after ethnic conflict. This analysis
will help determine if economic status has a relation to the rise of ethnic tension and
mistreatment of minorities. Other data such as the “International Religious Freedom
Report” and the “Global Democracy Ranking Report” will be evaluated in order to gain
valuable statistics about the governments and countries under review.
The main focus of this thesis is to evaluate different state approaches of the
treatment of minorities in the Western Balkan countries in order to understand how
government policies and actions affect levels of ethnic violence. The research question
presented in this thesis is as follows:
1. What factors influence levels of discrimination and ethnic tension in each
case?
In order to best answer the first question presented in this thesis an analysis of the
official reports of each country from governments and human rights organizations
concerning the ethnic violence of the late 1990’s-current is necessary. These documents
allow for the investigation of specific events that took place. An analysis of first-hand
accounts from victims of discrimination and violence will also be required in order to
better understand the tension and xenophobia shared by minorities and their governments.
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Chapter IV: Factors of Ethnic Violence: NATO Intervention
After a careful review of multiple factors, NATO and United States involvement has
made a large impact on ethnic and minority violence in the Western Balkans. Since the
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the role and powers
of the organization have shifted from a peacekeeping approach to conflict prevention and
direct military intervention. NATO involvement in the Balkan region stands as a turning
point for the organization, as it forced the alliance to begin a new era of conflict
management. The current instability and crises in the Balkan Region is a direct result of
NATO influence and lack of action in the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s. NATO
involvement in the region’s conflicts only stood to increase ethnic conflict as the
organization’s actions revealed a lack of true understanding of the issues.
This study will first examine the four major conflicts of the Yugoslav Wars, with
particular emphasis on NATO’s military involvement. By enacting a “closed door policy”
towards enlargement and its selective and strategic militarist interventions in the Balkan
Wars, NATO has shown a disregard for the citizens and their issues in the region. The
“Balkan Question” is only an example of NATO’s inability to correctly respond to
humanitarian crises in other regions of the world. Furthermore, NATO action and
subsequent removal from Balkan conflicts has increased levels of ethnic violence and
tension in the region. While this study shows varied evidence for the negative effects of
past NATO influence in the region, the question still remains if the Balkans could still
stand to gain from a strong NATO presence. NATO may still be able to save the delicate
transatlantic alliance by the strategic membership enlargement of Balkan countries.
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The Evolution of NATO
NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay was once famously quoted saying that
NATO’s purpose was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans
down.” This statement was largely true at the time, making the organization’s role seem
deceptively simple. However, over the last 65 years, the role of NATO has changed
drastically. At the core of the treaty, NATO sought to deter Soviet expansionism, halt any
revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on
the continent, and encourage European political integration. While NATO has
experienced successes in its 65-year history, the organization has seemingly abandoned
the Balkan region post break-up of Yugoslavia. With ethnic conflict worsening and the
number of conflict increasing, the region is searching for the organization that promised a
Europe “whole, free and at peace.”
In 1989, NATO accomplished its foremost initiative with the dissolution of
Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The greatest perceived threat to the United
States was soviet expansionism; most nations happily turned away from the region after
1989. The Balkans, however, were only to experience more violence and civil conflict.
Up until 1989, the primary purpose of the organization was to deter the Soviet Block, but
with it disbanded, NATO quickly had to evolve to meet these changes. Sensing the
tension, NATO began its mission as a cooperation and diplomatic alliance by allowing
former Warsaw Pact countries opportunities to partner with the organization. While
NATO encouraged former Soviet Block counties to engage in the Partnership for Peace
alliance, the organization still held onto the ideals of only involving in member countries’
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conflicts (Pagenkopf, 2014). While this inclusive exercise helped alleviate some former
Soviet tensions, the role of NATO would soon change again after 1989.
Fueled by the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union, the delicate balance of
power crushed the already unstable Yugoslavia. Countries began declaring independence,
exacerbated by the fears of instability and the hope for democracy and peace. To combat
the sudden rush of ethnic tension, NATO took on the role of a security organization
(Holmberg, 2011). During the 8 years of the Yugoslav Wars, NATO military forces
intervened in two of the conflicts with massive bombing campaigns and ground troop
forces. These specific interventions stood to fully recognize NATO as a military
organization, one that is willing to intervene on behalf of non-members countries.
NATO Interventions: Success or Failure?
The definition of success in NATO involvement is tricky, as it seems to change with the
year and type of conflict. As seen in the Libya crisis, NATO military involvement has
been hailed a success, while involvement in Balkans can only be classified as a failure.
This study uses scholarship from both sides of the debate to discuss the success of NATO
involvement in the Balkan region. While NATO involvement in international crises is
well studied, most scholarship remains to debate the effectiveness and definitions of
success for the organization. Supporters of NATO as an effective organization tout
NATO involvement in the Libya crisis in 2011 as the “success story” of the 21st century.
Through rapid response and collaboration with the surrounding countries, NATO
“remained [to be] an essential source of stability” (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012). Despite
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supposed successes in Libya, there are still questions of the relevancy of NATO in the
21st century.
Some believe that the primary purpose of NATO was to ensure the fall of the
Soviet Union; therefore, the organization soon became irrelevant after 1990 (McInnes,
1994). They argue that NATO was forced to become both a political security and military
defense organization in order to combat the sudden instability in Eastern Europe
(Holmberg, 2011). Unfortunately, NATO’s current and sporadic action in the Balkans
only seems to increase ethnic violence.
This study concludes that the success of NATO cannot only be measured by the
organization’s ability to meet its objectives; rather it should be measured by the outcome
and impact of actually meeting those objectives. Failure should be further defined as any
action that exacerbates violence or destabilizes the country after NATO involvement. As
NATO’s role is to “safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political
and military means”, the result of even a limited role in the worsening of ethnic, minority,
or gender violence is undoubtedly a failure.
When dealing with conflicts that involve terrorism, NATO’s role is clear, as its
purpose is understood: support U.S. efforts to combat terrorism (de Nevers, 2007). Even
before 2001, NATO and the U.S. clearly supported any deterrence of terrorism as it could
possibly harm our strategic and economic interests in Middle Eastern countries.
Unfortunately ethnic conflicts and humanitarian conflicts have never been a clear priority
for the US and NATO, which is further evident in the lack of involvement in the
Rwandan and Darfur genocides. NATO only involved itself in the Yugoslav Wars
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because of the fear of post-Soviet states becoming closer with Russia, thus harming the
strategic gains of the US and NATO after 1989. NATO missions in Yugoslavia were
never to be a success because of NATO’s lack of actual understanding and stake in the
unique ethnic conflicts in the region.

An Increase in Violence: NATO in the Balkans: 1989- 1999
Most experts agree that the NATO alliance was ill prepared for the sudden power vacuum
in Eastern Europe. In hopes of calming the region, NATO quickly created The North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Even though 11 of the former Soviet
republics accepted the “hand of friendship” and joined under the banner of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the partnership was not enough to quell the ethnic
tensions in the region (McInnes, 1994). The Yugoslav Wars began soon after the creation
of the NACC. The Yugoslav Wars consisted of four conflicts: the Slovenia War, the
Croatian War, the Bosnian War, and the Kosovo War. Most of these conflicts began
when Serbian-nationalists in the Yugoslav-countries, fueled by Serbia President Slobodan
Milosevic’s xenophobia and extreme nationalism, revolted against proposed
independence from Yugoslavia. While NATO had little involvement besides arms and
naval embargos in the first two conflicts, NATO direct military involvement in the
Bosnian and Kosovo Wars only managed to increase levels of ethnic violence.
The first conflict or the “10-Day War” began shortly after the election of Milan
Kucan in 1990. In 1991, war broke out between the Slovenia Territorial Defense and the
Yugoslav People’s Army or (JNA). The fighting ended a short 10 days after June 26th,
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1990. While this conflict did result in more than a dozen deaths and hundreds of injuries,
this war was of little concern to the major Yugoslav powers because of the small Serb
population within Slovenia. The next conflict was Croatia’s independence in 1991. This
conflict would last five years. Fueled by the fear and warmongering media campaign of
Milosevic, Croatian Serbs rejected Croatia’s independence and began fighting the
Croatian government (BBC, 2014). The Yugoslav People’s Army supplies the Serbian
nationalist with weapons and military assistance. By the end of the first year, one third of
Croatia was within Serbian control.
With former Yugoslavia falling apart, many non-Serbian citizens called on the
US, Europe, and NATO for assistance. Unfortunately, those calls fell on deaf ears.
NATO remained largely absent in the crises for the better part of the early 1990’s. With
two conflicts raging on, the former Yugoslav countries were falling apart, but little
attention was given from NATO. Unfortunately, when NATO did intervene, it only
created more conflict. “Operation Sharp Guard” started in 1995 and was carried out by
NATO and the European Union. Operation Sharp Guard was a joint naval blockade and
arms embargo of the Adriatic Sea and former Yugoslav countries. While the blockade’s
purpose was to halt the proliferation of military equipment across Eastern Europe, it
ended up helping the Serbian armies. The embargo actually managed to allow the
Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian militants to keep and spread their own weapons.
The embargo particularly gave the JNA an advantage over Croatia, securing their place as
the dominant militant group in former Yugoslavia (Cepanec, 2002). The results of the
embargo were obvious; even though indirectly, NATO action not only exacerbated ethnic
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conflict in the region, but also allowed the Serbian nationalists to nearly destroy the
newly independent Croatia.
“Adding Fuel to the Fire”: NATO in the Bosnian War
While the role of NATO is seemingly hard to determine in the Slovenia and Croatian
crises, the alliance’s failure in the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars directly related to an
increase in the ethnic violence seen later in the region. After Slovenia and Croatia’s
independence in 1991, conflict and violence spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. While all
countries in the Balkans are characterized by their diverse ethnic nature, Bosnia and
Herzegovina has one of the most complex ethnic populations. The 1991 Bosnia National
Census and Council of Europe estimate the Bosnia population as follows: Bosniaks
(43.5%), Serbs (31.2%), Croats (17.4%), Yugoslavs (5.5%) and Others (2.4%). Out of
the whole population, over 34% identified as Muslim, which is considered a national
recognized minority (Council of Europe, 2004). This diverse population led to the one of
the most violent conflicts of the 20th Century.
The Bosnian War began in 1992 with the Bosnian Serbs rejecting Bosnia’s
declaration of independence. Known for his extreme islamophobia, Milosevic attacked
the capital of Bosnia in order to “protect” the Serb minority from Bosnian Muslims. The
Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army, armed Serbian nationalists and
soon mobilized their forces in order to secure Serbian territory within Bosnia and
Herzegovina. As in Croatian Independence War, the Serbs were quickly able to secure
territory because of NATO’s arms embargo and the JNA’s ability to distribute military
equipment across the region. The conflict lasted 3 years, and resulted in the most lives
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lost since World War II. During the three-year conflict, over 100,000 died, 2.2 million
were displaced, and the largest recorded mass-rape campaign was recorded. According to
Lene Hansen’s work on mass-rape during the Bosnian War, between 20,000-50,000
women were systemically raped as a form of genetic cleansing in order to create a longlasting Serbian patrilineal legacy (Hansen, 2001).
Although most depictions of NATO involvement portray the NATO bombing of
Bosnia in 1995 to be its first example of involvement in the region, the organization’s
action leading up to the 1995 bombing depict a different account. The most violent acts
of ethnic conflict began after the failed 1991 US-sponsored peace agreement between
groups fighting in Croatia. Between 1992-1995, the role of NATO in the Bosnia War
evolved from monitoring to enforcing compliance, and then finally in 1995, to full
military involvement.
In 1992, NATO agreed to monitor and secure UN missions “Operation Sharp
Vigilance”, “Operation Maritime Guard”, and “Operation Maritime Monitor”; all of
which helped secure the arms embargo and restricted air and maritime zone around the
Balkan countries. In the events leading to the 1995 NATO bombing campaign in Bosnia,
the scope of NATO involvement evolved to include limited bombing and forcing
compliance of UN “safe” zones. When Serb forces attacked the UN safe zone in Goražde,
NATO responded by limited bombing campaigns of Serbia forces. This attack came
without regard to the safety or well-being of UN officers, which led to the capture and
murder of dozens of NATO peacekeepers and Goražde Bosniaks.
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While NATO did have a small hand in Bosnian affairs pre-1995, most of the
efforts were ineffective. NATO intervention only stood to increase the amount of
violence and uncertainty for both Bosniaks and UN peacekeepers. The real failure of
NATO in the Bosnia War, however, came in 1995. Described as the “West’s Greatest
Shame” by Brookings Senior Foreign Policy Fellow Ivo H. Daalder, the massacre of UN
“safe” zone Srebrenica (a small village with over 60,000 Muslims) was the turning point
for NATO involvement in the conflict. In the days leading up to the events of Srebrenica,
Serb forces were transparent in their plan on attacking the safe zone. Backed by the fear
of retaliation by the international community, both NATO and the UN failed to protect
the Bosnian Muslims in order to maintain partiality in the crisis. NATO agreed to
“traditional peacekeeping practices”, which in turn allowed Serb forces no opposition
(Daalder, 1998). In no more than 10 days, Serb forces carried out the largest mass
extinction of a minority since the Holocaust. Over 7,000 Muslims were murdered, and
thousands more women were subject to mass-rape and sex slavery (Honig & Both, 1996).
Even though the genocide had taken place since the beginning of the war, NATO
failure to respond to Serb threats to UN safe zones mark the overall failure of NATO in
Bosnia. In response to the Srebrenica massacre, NATO began its first-ever military
operation by launching a campaign of air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in 1995.
“Operation Deliberate Force” was NATO first full-scale military operation, with over
1,100 bombs dropped in a one-month timeframe. The bombing was aimed for certain
strongholds of Serb forces within Bosnia, and quickly resulted in a ceasefire between the
Bosnian and Serb parties (Kutsch, 2013). The NATO campaign in 1995 ended with the
military stalemate of the ethnic parties’ signing of the Dayton Accord. While most of the
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world quickly turned away from the Balkan region after the parties signed the Dayton
Accord, NATO influence would continue to exacerbate ethnic conflict in the region.
Even before beginning its bombing campaign and the proposal of the Dayton
Accord in 1995, NATO involvement only escalated and helped the proliferation of ethnic
conflict through mindless arms embargos, and lack of effective use of force against Serb
forces. Furthermore, the Dayton Accord only positioned Bosnia for an unclear and
unattainable path to peaceful state building. Richard Caplan, in his research on the
Dayton Accord, argues that the structure of the Accord is the reason for Bosnia’s
continued failure in the region. The Accord heavily emphasizes the military aspects of
peace rather than the civil, and focuses on and promotes the segregation of ethnic parties
in the political participation process (Caplan 2000). The separation of ethnic parties only
worsens the problem of ethnic conflict, as evident in the United States’ policy of racial
segregation in the 1950’s (Taylor, 2003). This accord, followed with demands of the
deployment of 60,000 NATO troops to “carry out” the new constitution, only stood to
prolong Bosnia’s image as a war-torn and hopeless country for ethnic diversity. These
final steps by NATO and US forces cemented the failure of the organization as both an
international state builder, and a military force in the Balkan region.
Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo after NATO Involvement: 1999-2001
The NATO campaign of 1995 was crucial to the development of NATO; the organization
was now seen as a military powerhouse that had the ability to involve itself in Balkan
disputes. The newfound militaristic power of NATO was soon exercised again in the
Kosovo War in 1999 with the unsanctioned 11-week bombing campaign of Yugoslavia
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over Kosovo. While different ethnic groups fought during the Kosovo War, NATO action
in the war would soon mirror the failures of the Bosnian War.
Unlike the Bosnian War, the negative effects of NATO involvement have been
widely studied and debated. The Kosovo providence of Serbia was one of the major
enclaves for ethnic-Albanians in Serbia. As Serbian nationalists continually opposed
independence from Yugoslavia, the ethnic-Albanians in the minority enclave of Serbia
soon grew nervous of the Serbia agenda. In response to Serbia’s inevitable prosecution
of the minority, the ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo rejected Serbian engagements
in Croatia and Bosnia, and formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1991. From
1995-1996, the KLA started its campaign to sabotage Serbian-run police stations in
Kosovo, and started to receive smuggled weapons from Albania. With ethnic tensions
between the Serbs and ethnic-Albanians at an all-time high, the Kosovo War broke out
in 1998. In March of 1998, open conflict between the KLA forces and the Serbian police
broke out in civil war. Almost immediately after the ensuing bloodshed between the two
parties, Secretary of State, Madeline Albright was famously quoted saying, “''We are not
going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no
longer get away with doing in Bosnia” (Erlanger, 1998). While these comments seemed
to promote the Balkan’s best interest, NATO involvement will only seem to benefit US
interests abroad.
Only months after the comments on the Kosovo crisis from the former Secretary
of State, NATO flew 85 warplanes over Albania and Macedonia in “Operation
Determined Falcon” in hopes of stalling Serb forces in Kosovo. Colloquially known as
the “1995 Balkan Air Show”, the operation only seemed to force NATO military action
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and worsen ethnic conflict in Serbia (Kiss, 2014). In result of these actions, Serb forces
retaliate and systematically attack thousands of Kosovar Albanians in villages in
Kosovo. In one of the most violent summer offensives, Serbian forces killed over 1500
ethnic-Albanians and displaced over 300,000 (International Crisis Group, 1998). While
thousands of ethnic-Albanian were displaced and murdered in response to NATO action,
NATO officials still negotiated the preferred actions of the organization. Only in 1999
did NATO officials begin to act in the Kosovo crisis.
On March 24, 1999, NATO forces began a 78 bombing campaign in Serbia.
NATO action was soon disregarded as mere “coercive-diplomacy” and subsequently
replaced with efforts of engaging in a full-scale “humanitarian war” in Kosovo. While
no one argues the results of NATO action in Kosovo, the principle justification for the
war was and is still being debated today. NATO acted without consent of UN Security
Council—the first unauthorized NATO action of its kind. Most scholars argue the just
cause of NATO intervention was for the sake of preventing wide scale human rights
abuses. If human rights were just cause for war, then why intervene in Kosovo, but not
in Rwanda or Bosnia? NATO used genocide in Kosovo as the reason for war, although
the total causalities of war (2,000 for both Serb and minorities) do not qualify the crisis
as genocide (Enuka, 2013). The reasoning by the Clinton administration’s decision to
involve NATO in Kosovo is still unknown, but its failure to prevent human rights and
ethnic conflict is evident in the weeks following the bombing of Serbia.
In a little over one month after the initial bombing campaign began, over half a
million Kosovar Albanians and other ethnic minorities fled Kosovo and Serbia. Adam
Roberts, senior research Fellow at Oxford, explains that the bombardment of Kosovo
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and Serbia only stood to increase both the number and severity of ethnic conflict within
the country (Roberts, 1999). Even a spokesperson from the Clinton administration was
quoted saying that the Kosovo had indeed taken "a dramatic and serious turn for the
worse” following the NATO bombing campaign (Williams, 1999). The hundreds of
thousands of refugees flooded into neighboring countries of Macedonia, and Albanian,
only to stir up ethnic tensions within these countries. The 1999 Macedonian Refugee
Crisis was a direct effect of NATO bombing in Serbia. Macedonia received over
344,500 refugees in an unprecedented 9 weeks of immigration (Donev, Onceva &
Gligorov, 2002). Neither the refugees nor the host countries were prepared for the
influx, causing some conflict between the refugees and the Macedonians.
Besides the negative effects the bombing campaign had on the displacement
rates of ethnic-Albanians and minorities during the crisis, NATO action even began to
increase the amount of minority killings across the countries. Although over 90% of the
ethnic-Albanian population was displaced during the crisis, Serbian forces still found
and retaliated against the remaining minority. In a study focused on human rights abuses
of ethnic-Albanians after NATO involvement, the researchers conclude that over 50%
saw Serb forces killing, torturing, directly separating families or burning Albanianowned structures after the NATO bombings (Iacopino et al., 2001). Even though the
actions of Serbian forces in Kosovo were not considered “genocide”, the horrors faced
by the ethnic-Albanians and other minorities seem to further highlight the failures of the
US and NATO foreign policy in the region. One ethnic-Albanian explained that the
“Serbs can’t fight NATO, so now they are after us” (Roberts, 1999).

31

The 78-day bombing campaign ended in June 1999 when President Milosevic
agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo (BBC, 2012). Unfortunately, Kosovo’s troubles
were far from over. Kosovar Albanians fought for independence on the principle of the
universal right to self-determination and statehood. The minority used the UN
Declaration of Human Rights as backing, but was soon met with resistance from NATO
forces. While NATO fought under the guise of allowing for Kosovo’s independence,
NATO signed the Kumanovo Agreement with little intention to give Kosovo statehood.
One of the main tenants of the agreement was the five-kilometer safety zone around
Kosovo, which denied access of Serbian troops into the region. This, however, did
nothing to give the ethnic-Albanians independence.
Besides questions of Kosovo statehood (questions that would not be answered
until 2008), implications for future military involvement on the basis of human rights
were raised. While the causalities in Kosovo were horrible in their own right, the scope
of the war cannot compare to crises in South Sudan, Sierra Leone, or Rwanda. If crises
in those African nations did not warrant involvement, why did Kosovo receive
international aid? NATO involvement in Kosovo only seemed to confuse and belittle
any standing international law in intervening on behalf of humanitarian causes
(Mandlebaum, 1999). Introspectively, the Kosovo War seems to result in yet another
NATO military failure in the region. After reviewing all four of the crises in the
Yugoslav Wars, NATO action seemed to exacerbate ethnic conflict, and only give way
to international confusion and uncertainty about the future and roles of the organization.
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Chapter V: Implications
With its beginnings founded upon principles of containing Soviet influence in Europe,
NATO has continually transformed its roles throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.
Heading into nearly 66 years of existence, NATO’s role must again evolve in order to
save the delicate balance of the transatlantic alliance. Even after countless conflicts, the
region is still susceptible to extreme ethnic conflict without proper stabilization. Instead
of seeing the Balkan region as “NATO’s burden”, the region could possibly hold
important military and economic benefits for the alliance. The “Balkan Question” is one
that NATO has yet to solve, and enlargement may actually be the answer.
Throughout NATO’s enlargement history, scholars have debated the importance
of gaining members of NATO. While some believe that the Yugoslav Wars led NATO to
“an irreversible path of enlargement”, most countries that have received NATO
membership have enjoyed relative peace and stability (Kay, 1998). Most opposition to
enlargement for the Balkan countries has come from Russia, and US officials who feel
that taking more countries into NATO would only increase the dependency on the US
during times of crisis (Malksoo, 2004).
While there could be drawbacks to adding Balkan countries to the alliance, the
reality is that enlargement has helped US image in the Balkan area, and a commitment to
a united Balkans seems to coincide with a Europe “whole, free and at peace”. The Balkan
region is described as a “geo-political gateway” for its strategically important location for
oil reserves, engagements in the Middle East, and a secure base for close Russia
operations (Fouskas, 2003). Both the U.S. and NATO could benefit from a stronger
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alliance with the region. While the era of NATO as a military war hawk may be over,
there has never been a more important time for a strong and untied stabilizer for the
region.
Ethnic conflict in the Balkans is directly related to NATO “missteps” and
intervention policies in past Yugoslav Wars, and as a result of botched enlargement
campaigns. In order to stem the ethnic violence in the region, and maintain the Balkan
alliance, NATO must rethink their military strategies and open their “open door policy”
again. If the alliance were to carefully navigate through the conflicts of the Balkans while
allowing for membership for eligible aspiring nations, NATO could both curtail ethnic
violence while keeping Eastern Europe at peace.

34

References

Bardos, Gordon N. "Containing Kosovo." Mediterranean Quarterly 16.3 (2005): 17-43.
Political Science Complete. Web. 9 July 2014.
Beurmann, K. (2007). Human Rights in Kosovo. Human Rights Review, 9(1), 41-54.
doi:10.1007/s12142-007-0028-0
Brunwasser, M. (2009). Owning Alexander. Archaeology, 62(1), 55-59.
Caplan, R. (2000). Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diplomacy
& Statecraft, 11(2), 213.
Cepanec, Ž. (2002). Croatia and NATO: The stony road to membership. Potsdam: Miles
Verlag.
Council of Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers. (2004). REPORT
SUBMITTED BY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA OF THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (Report
No. ACFC/SR (2004) 001). Retrieved from
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/_fcnmdocs/PDF_1st_SR_BiH_e
nppd
Croatia profile. (2014, May 8). BBC Europe. Retrieved October 26, 2014.
Daftary, Farimah. "Territorial Autonomy As A Response To Violent Self-Determination
Conflicts: 'Too Little, Too Late'?." Conference Papers -- International Studies
Association (2008): 1-37. Academic Search Premier. Web. 9 July 2014.
Danforth, L. (1993). Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the
Breakup of Yugoslavia. Anthropology Today, 9(4). Retrieved November 1, 2014,
from JSTOR.

35

Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece The Macedonians of Greece The
Macedonians of Greece. Rep. no. 94-75891. New York: n.p., 1994. Human Rights
Watch. Web. 2 June 2014.
Enuka, C. (2013). NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo: An Analysis of the Just War
Principles of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello. IUP Journal of International
Relations, 7(1), 7-35.
Erlanger, S. (1998, March 8). Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence. The New York
Times. Retrieved November 1, 2014.
Fearon, James D. What Is Identity (As We Now We The Word)? Diss. Stanford U, 1999.
Stanford: n.p., 1999. Print.
Fouskas, V. (2003). Zones of Conflict US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater
Middle East. Sterling: Pluto Press.
Ghitis, Frida. "Macedonia Tries To Part The Clouds On Its Horizon." World Politics
Review (Selective Content) (2010): 1. Academic Search Premier. Web. 7 July
2014.
Hansen, L. (2001). Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security.
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3(1), 55-75.
doi:10.1080/14616740010019848
Honig, J. W., & Both, N. (1996). Srebrenica: Record of a war crime (pp. 177-178).
London: Penguin.
Horncastle, J. (2013). Reaping the Whirlwind: Total National Defense's Role in
Slovenia's Bid for Secession. Journal Of Slavic Military Studies, 26(3), 528-550.
doi:10.1080/13518046.2013.813296
Hostages of Tension Intimidation and Harassment of Ethnic Albanians in Serbia after
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Issue brief no. 1-56432-394-3. New
York: Human Rights Watch, 2008. Web. 4 June 2014.

36

Iacopino, V., Frank, M. W., Bauer, H. M., Keller, A. S., Fink, S. L., Ford, D., & ...
Waldman, R. (2001). A Population-Based Assessment of Human Rights Abuses
Committed Against Ethnic Albanian Refugees From Kosovo. American Journal
of Public Health, 91(12), 2013-2018.
ICG Balkans Report. (1998). Kosovo’s Long Hot Summer: Briefing on military,
humanitarian and political developments in Kosovo (Report No. 41). Retrieved
from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/europe/kosovo%203.pdf
Kay, S. (1998). NATO Enlargement. In NATO and the Future of European Security.
Rowman & Littlefield.
Khmelko, Irina, and Krista E. Wiegand. "Government Repression in Ethnic Conflict:
Institutional Incentives and Cultural Legacies." International Journal on World
Peace 27.2 (2010): 7-34. Academic Search Premier. Web. 7 July 2014.
Kiss, P. (2014). Winning Wars amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict.
Nebraska: Potomac Books.
Kutsch, T. (2013, September 5). Interactive: US interventions post-Cold War. Aljazeera.
Retrieved October 25, 2014.
Lebamoff, Mary Frances, and Zoran Ilievski. "The Ohrid Framework Agreement In
Macedonia: Neither Settlement Nor Resolution Of Ethnic Conflict?." Conference
Papers -- International Studies Association (2008): 1. Academic Search Premier.
Web. 15 July 2014.
Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." The American
Political Science Review 65.3 (1971): 682. Web. 8 June 2014.
Luke, C. (2014, September 1). U.S. must help usher Macedonia into NATO over Greek
objections. Washington Post. Retrieved November 1, 2014.
Mandlebaum, M. (1999). A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia. Foreign
Affairs, 78(5), 2-8. Retrieved September 29, 2014, from JSTOR

37

McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case
Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. London: Routledge, 1993. Print.
Macnamara, R. (2012). Slavic Muslims: The forgotten minority of Macedonia. Security
& Human Rights, 23(4), 347-355.
Osipov, Alexander. "Non-Territorial Autonomy and International Law." International
Community Law Review 13.4 (2011): 393-411. Academic Search Premier. Web.
15 July 2014.
Pagenkopf, C. (2014). COOPERATION IS THE KEY TO NATO'S FUTURE. U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, 140(9), 66-70.
Pavkovic, Aleksandar. "Secession, Minority Rule, and Equal Rights." Macquarie Law
Journal (2003): n. pag. Print.
Pavkovic, Aleksandar, and Peter Rada. "In Pursuit of Sovereignty and SelfDetermination." Macquarie Law Journal 3 (2008): n. pag. Print.
Richter, Solveig, and Uwe Halbach. "A Dangerous Precedent? The Political Implications
of Kosovo's Independence on Ethnic Conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and The
CIS." Security & Human Rights 20.3 (2009): 223-237. Academic Search Premier.
Web. 9 July 2014.
Taylor, K. (2003). Civil rights and civil wrongs: Racism in America today. International
Socialist Review, (32). Retrieved November 1, 2014, from
http://www.isreview.org/issues/32/racism.shtml
Timeline: Kosovo. (2012, January 24). BBC Europe. Retrieved November 5, 2014.
What is NATO? (2014, January 1). Retrieved November 12, 2014, from
http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/
Williams, Daniel. (1999). Brutal Conditions Enveloping Kosovo; Reports Say Civilians
Face Rising Violence. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 28, 2014.
Wolff, Stefan. "Ethnic Minorities and Territorial Autonomy." BBC World Service. BBC.
21 Jan. 2005. Radio. Transcript.
38

Zagorchevia, D. (2012). NATO Enlargement and Security in the Balkans. Journal of
Regional Security, 7(1). Retrieved October 28, 2014.
Zahariadis, N. (1994). Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response
to the Macedonian Issue. Political Science Quarterly, 109(4). Retrieved
November 2, 2014, from JSTOR.

39

